Обсуждение:Битва за Китайскую ферму (KQvr';yuny&>nmfg [g TnmgwvtrZ syjbr)

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Участник IgorpJ добавил в статью цифры о потерях обеих сторон. Я посмотрел в начало статье и увидел выражение - На направлении израильского удара стояла 21-я танковая дивизия египтян. Т.е. в сражении участвовала потреппаная в боях 14 октября дивизия. Штатный состав дивизии на начало войны 1-я бригада 124 танка, 14-я бригада 124 танка и 18-я бригада 31 танк. Далее смотрим цифры потерь которые написал участник, первый бой египтяне якобы потеряли 150 танков, второй 160. А если прибавить к этому потери дивизии до 15 октября (а это больше половины дивизии), то получится что мы уничтожили 21-ю дивизию несколько раз, да еще у нее и остались танки. Тут нужно найти точную информацию об участвующих египетских подразделениях, откуда эти цифры, может подкрепления были, так надо было сначала указать информацию о подкреплениях. Потомучто на сегодняшний день читатель поймет написанную информацию как "310 потерянных 21-й дивизией танков". 128.69.188.148 15:13, 20 марта 2017 (UTC)

Из всех указанных цифр только 70 танков потерянных 14-й бригадой Решефа были точными. Цифры 150, 80-100 и 160 не понять ни как получились ни к какому подразделению относятся. 128.69.188.148 15:29, 20 марта 2017 (UTC)

Из карты в начале статьи я добавляю информацию об участвующих дивизиях. 128.69.188.148 15:30, 21 марта 2017 (UTC)

Б, или о некорректном переводе

Участник 128.69.188.148, вы добавили в статью информацию, якобы :( на основании приведенного вами же АИ: 23:55, 19 марта 2017

Утром 17 октября контратакующие египетские части вышли с позиции «Миссури» и из района Китайской фермы в направлении дороги Акавиш. В это же время командир израильской 162-й дивизии генерал Адан приказал бросить к Китайской ферме все имеющиеся боеспособные танки. В результате произошло огромное встречное танковое сражение между 1-й и 14-й египетскими бригадами и 162-й и 143-й израильскими дивизиями. Израильтяне смогли удержать Китайскую ферму, потери обеих сторон были огромны.

К сожалению перевод оказался некорректным, и его пришлось поправить, добавив данные из того же источника:

Утром 17 октября контратакующие египетские части вышли с позиции «Миссури» и из района Китайской фермы с целью разблокировать дорогу Акавиш. На западе зоны атаки батальон Амира Яффе успешно отразил серию атак без потерь со своей стороны. Тем временем командир израильской 162-й дивизии генерал Адан реорганизовал свои силы для усиления батальона Яффе. В результате произошло массовое встречное танковое сражение между 1-й и 14-й египетскими бригадами и 162-й и 143-й израильскими дивизиями. В результате пятичасового ожесточенного боя Адан обеспечил контроль над дорогами Тиртур и Акавиш и захватил южную часть Китайскую фермы. Израильтяне потеряли от 80 до 100 танков, египтяне - минимум 160.

Так что ваши претензии просто непонятны. М.быть, вместо них стоило бы извиниться за некорректное изложение приведенного на той же р.81 в вашем же АИ? --Igorp_lj (обс.) 16:29, 20 марта 2017 (UTC)

Для чего вы так упорно удаляете выражение что генерал Адан приказал бросить все имеющееся боеспособные танки к Китайской ферме, ведь оно четко написано в книге - At dawn of the 17th Adan prepared to throw every available tank at the Chinese Farm. У вас же если прочитать то там один батальон Яффе воевал, логической связки нет. 128.69.188.148 14:45, 21 марта 2017 (UTC)

Хочу заметить что главная пробела на сегодняшний день это какие подразделения понесли эти потери, так как наша статья противоречит сама себе. 128.69.188.148 14:48, 21 марта 2017 (UTC)

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Примерные потери в сражении

Потери личного состава, ночь с 15 на 16 израильтяне признавали 300 убитых и 1000 раненых, египтяне признавали 500 убитых (т.е. раненых могло быть оценочно 1500), с утра 16 по утро 17 израильтяне признавали 950 убитых и раненых, египтяне 2900 убитых и раненых, до середины 18 еще гдето по 200 убитых и раненых потеряли (у египтян 25-я бригада, у израильтян от обстрела переправы). Т.е. за все сражение египтяне потеряли примерно 5000 убитых и раненых, израильтяне 2500. 37.146.77.188 20:38, 27 февраля 2019 (UTC)

В каком АИ и где конкретно? Хорошо бы еще какую-то цитату. --Igorp_lj (обс.) 23:56, 27 февраля 2019 (UTC)

Я уже сам не помню где я это находил, что сам додумывал я отметил "могло быть" "оценочно", т.к. здесь мои есть мои личные оценки я не могу это полностью добавить в статью, может вам известны потери египтян за ночь 15 октября? 37.146.77.188 21:56, 7 марта 2019 (UTC)

Нашел источник на полные израильские потери, что интересно раненые не сходятся если смотреть по каждому дню (например, Ариэль Шарон говорил что в ночь с 15 на 16 в его дивизии было 1000 раненых), у нас за все дни 1200. 77.41.225.54 17:12, 23 июня 2019 (UTC)

Битва за Китайскую ферму после 18

Битва за Хамуталь:

8-я: We were told that there were only a few Egyptians there, but afterward it turned out that both sites were part of an Egyptian division's formation.

Over the wireless my buddies heard our force commander getting an order from the brigade commander, Yoel Gonen (Gorodish), to stay put. Our commander, a lieutenant in the reserves, explained to Gonen that if we did not get out of there, we would all be killed. In the wake of what seemed to us to be the officer's "refusal of order," we were authorized to abandon the hill, and were able to find cover in the bed of a small wadi.

9-я: Ninth assault

Our assault on the hill called Hamutal was the ninth attempt by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to take the site. Four years ago, Itai Asher published an article in the daily Maariv about the attacks, and summed it up thus: "Nine times IDF armored battalions tried to take Hamutal hill, nine times they assaulted the high dune on both sides of the road leading to the Suez Canal, nine times they backed off, battered, wounded and dead, leaving behind the scorched bodies of dozens of their commanders and buddies."

It is hard to believe, but after eight failed attacks, when we were assigned the mission of taking the hill, no one bothered to tell us what had happened to those who tried before us, and no one told us about the size of the Egyptian force that was lying in wait for us there. In the view of Yossi Cohen, the officers who sent us to execute that last assault on Hamutal are responsible for all the losses of his unit: three killed, 18 wounded and an unknown number of psychological casualties.

"I didn't know, either [what had gone on before]," says Brigadier General (res.) Yoel Gonen, the brigade commander at the time. If he had known then what he knows now, he adds, he would have violated the order himself. "I received a report that the Egyptians were retreating. If I had known about the earlier assaults, I would not have gone into action. On the other hand, my brother, Shmuel [GOC Southern Command] knew about the earlier attacks. In the middle of the attack I was contacted by Gideon Altschuler, who was in charge of the headquarters of Arik [Ariel] Sharon, who told me to be careful because there had been many previous assaults. But we were already inside."

That is not entirely accurate, because Yoel Gonen knew at least about the results of the previous assault, the eighth. On Friday, October 19, his brigade was given responsibility for Hamutal and Machshir. A battalion that was seconded to the brigade, under the command of Major Aryeh Artzi, which had taken part in a previous assault on the hill within a different brigade framework, was ordered to launch an attack again - also on Hamutal. (Gonen says he received the command effectively only when the assault was at its height.) Again the attacking force came under Egyptian missile fire, and the sector commander, Sasson Yitzhaki, ordered the soldiers to stop the action. Three disabled tanks and a company commander remained on Hamutal, and all the efforts to pull them out failed. The eighth assault on the hill had ended.

The next day, October 20, Yitzhaki ordered Yoel Gonen to attack Hamutal again. "I knew that Artzi had failed in the attack on the 19th," Gonen confirms, "but he was only a battalion commander and I was a brigade commander." Ahead of this attack, a force called Atzlut was established - half of what remained of the 274th Brigade, including two companies of captured Soviet T-55 tanks and two companies of armored infantry, one mounted on Zeldas [M113 light armored personnel carriers], and the other, my company, on half-tracks.

The company of Zeldas was made up of soldiers who had just completed their compulsory army service, while our company was composed mostly of former Nahal (combining military and kibbutz service) soldiers, "old-timers" of 26, who had already fought in the Six-Day War. Apart from one platoon, we had spent most of the Yom Kippur War doing nothing, in the northern Sinai sector, next to the Baluza base; generally the shells flew over our heads on their way to more important targets. Typically for this war, I had a machine gun which, despite efforts by various technicians, refused to fire more than one bullet without jamming.

As a precautionary measure, Cohen did not want to launch the attack until the late afternoon. Even though we were being sent to take on a supposedly small Egyptian force, we were promised air support and an artillery barrage before we set out. However, both Gonen and Cohen remember only two Phantoms that dropped bombs from an altitude of 30,000 feet. The artillery barrage, meant to "soften up" the Egyptians, also remains in my memory as no more than symbolic.

From our lofty observation point, with an unimpeded view of the spectacular sunset, I remember burning Zeldas on the slopes of Hamutal. Some of them had struck mines, others had been hit by missiles. When our presence was discovered, we, too, became the targets of accurate shelling: At every place we fled from, shells landed within seconds.

Cohen, who was already on Hamutal with his tanks, summoned us to extricate the wounded from the disabled Zeldas. Flat-trajectory Egyptian fire from Machshir crashed into Hamutal, and it was only by a miracle that we were not hit. Strangely, try as I might, I can't remember anything else about the dangerous rescue operation.

On the wireless my buddies heard the brigade commander, whom Cohen had briefed on the situation, ordering him to stay on the hill. Cohen explained that if he were to do that, we would not survive, as we were stuck there without any real cover, like ducks in a shooting gallery. He suggested that the armored infantry pull back and that the ranks withdraw to a back slope and hide there.

'More metal'

"I knew what was happening," Yossi Cohen says, revealing that he was in breach not only of the brigade commander's order, but also of a directive from the GOC Southern Command. "According to the firepower from Machshir, I understood that there was a terrifying force there, but I did not want to say that over the central [communications] network. I knew that everyone in the area was listening, because this was the only battle going on that night; to this day I meet people who heard me then. So I asked Yoel Gonen to switch to the second network, and I told him, 'Listen, there are a lot of casualties here and the situation is bad. If we stay, the Egyptians will use us for target practice and there is no way we will get out of here alive. We have to come down from the hill.' To which he said, 'No, stay!'

Michael Kalai, the battalion's operations officer, who had followed the conversation over the communications network, remembers, like many others, both Cohen's cool, calm and collected tone of voice, but also the furious Major General Shmuel "Gorodish" Gonen asking, "Who is the force commander there?" Told it was a lieutenant, he snapped, "Can't we send over someone with more metal on his shoulders?" Shortly afterward, the deputy brigade commander was sent to the hill.

Was that the extra "metal" your brother wanted?

Yoel Gonen: "No. The ranks are only a sign. In cases like that you don't check what is on the shoulders, but what there is between the legs."

Gonen was apparently apprehensive that the question was an implicit criticism of him for not having gone to the hill himself. "It was a small attack on the fringes of the brigade," he explains. "I did not have to be there. I have proof that I was usually with the forces that were engaged in combat. I don't know exactly what the deputy brigade commander did there."

Cohen: "I don't know why you sent him."

Gonen: "What - was I supposed to come?"

Cohen: "No. The company commander of the armored infantry unit came to me, and his attitude was completely different. He said, 'Yossi, you are a hero. Listen, the deputy brigade commander is sitting there in the half-track and isn't doing anything. What are we supposed to do?' I told him to collect all the soldiers, make a chain and comb the area eastward in order to bring in all the dead and wounded, and after that they would leave."

When the cease-fire came into effect officially, on October 24, the hill remained in Israel's hands. According to Cohen, that proves that his refusal of the order not only saved the lives of many soldiers, but also brought about the completion of the mission: the conquest of Hamutal, which would have been impossible if done in the way formulated by the high command.

Cohen says that on the eve of the attack on Hamutal, he did not know that a cease-fire was imminent. Would he have refused the order to attack the hill if he had known that eight previous attempts had failed, at the potentially heavy price of losing his life? "Yes," Cohen replies. He did not do so "because I never imagined that a commanding officer would send us to almost certain death. Refusal of the order came after it was clear to me that the mission could be accomplished without further sacrifice of life and limb! In retrospect, my considerations turned out to have been right."

Talk of a coup

With the passage of time, our memory tends to play tricks on us. Many soldiers and officers, including Yossi Cohen himself, are convinced that he refused to carry out an order issued by the brigade commander. But Yoel Gonen now claims that he did not insist on his original order, but, on the contrary: He was persuaded by Cohen's explanation and accepted his suggestion to remove the forces from Hamutal. Thus, as far as he is concerned, there was no refusal of order, only temporary differences, which were resolved with the agreement of both parties. In an interview to Maariv in 2003, he even described the pullback from Hamutal as his decision: "I received an order to capture the hill. I made a small effort, but when things became complicated, I decided to come down from the hill, so as not to beat my head against the wall."

There is also more than one version about what happened afterward. According to Cohen, all the armored infantry left Hamutal during the night and only he remained with his tanks on a back slope. However, what my buddies and I remember is that we did not actually vacate the site, but hid overnight in a nearby small wadi. At dawn we saw that the hills opposite us were packed with Egyptian soldiers staring at us.

That astonishing image is one of the few that remains engraved in my memory. Because the cease-fire took effect, we were not fired on, nor did we open fire. What we did was to get out of there, fast. Here, too, my vivid personal memories and those of some of my friends clash with the official version, according to which the cease-fire only took effect in the evening.

According to Gonen, the disparities in our attitudes toward the battle are due to the differences between the viewpoint of a soldier and that of the brigade commander. "For you it was something big, because it was the only point at which you went into battle, but for us it was a little speck in the campaign. You were there and to you it looked like the whole world. The whole thing was just a bleep. Hamutal was not a heroic battle or a significant one. What Yossi did, by means of which he managed to hold onto Hamutal, has no importance today in terms of whether the border passes in one place or another, because we ceded everything, but at the time it was important."

Why?

Gonen: "Because we look for the achievements, for the conquest. We look for the success. It's good for my ego and it's good for his ego that we took part of the hill."

Gonen relates that he admires and loves Cohen to this day, and at the time even tried to promote him by two ranks and appoint him battalion commander. "My brother was already a broken man. If he had remained, Yossi would have received the ranks. My brother knew exactly how many times Hamutal was attacked and where the forces there remained, and where Yossi remained. We could be satisfied that part of Hamutal remained in our hands."

Как видим Хамуталь был взят лишь частично во время 9-го штурма с помощью батальона танков Ti-67 и двух рот M113. 77.41.225.54 07:59, 7 сентября 2019 (UTC)

Что за выражение такое у нас в статье "Три поврежденных «Центуриона»", где слово поврежденный в статье если там написано disabled, выведенный из строя, два совершенно разных понятия. 77.41.225.54 08:03, 7 сентября 2019 (UTC)

77.41.225.54 С "выведенным из строя" соглашусь. Отмечу только, что разница между моим и вашим вариантом много меньше, чем между вашей первой редакцией

3 «Центуриона» было брошено на холме

и моей, исходя из того же АИ:

Три поврежденных «Центуриона» и командир роты остались на холме.

- самой ситуации :( Можете это объяснить?

Кстати, было бы хорошо найти ее описание еще в каком-то источнике, а не только в этом. — Igorp_lj (обс.) 16:32, 8 сентября 2019 (UTC)