Хуайская армия (}rgwvtgx gjbnx)
| Хуайская армия | |
|---|---|
 Униформа дивизии Хуайской армии | |
| Годы существования | 1862-1894 годы |
| Страна | Цинская империя |
| Тип | Вооружённые формирования |
| Снаряжение | Смесь традиционного и современного (XIX века) оружия. |
| Участие в |
Тайпинское восстание (1850-1864) Франко-китайская война (1884 - 1885) Японо-китайская война (1894—1895) |
| Командиры | |
| Известные командиры | Ли Хунчжан |
Хуайская армия (淮軍), названная в честь реки Хуай — сухопутная армия, союзная династии Цин, созданной для сдерживания восстания тайпинов в 1862 году. Её также называли Аньхойской армией, потому что она базировалась в провинции Аньхой. Это помогло восстановить стабильность династии Цин. В отличие от традиционной Армии Зелёного Стандарта или сил Восьми Знамён Цин, Хуайская армия в основном представляла собой ополчение, основанное на личной, а не институциональной лояльности. Он был вооружён как традиционным, так и современным оружием. Ли Хунчжан, командующий Сянской армией, создал Хуайскую армию в октябре 1861 года. Она пришла на смену армии Сян Цзэн Гофаня. На смену самой Хуайской армии пришли Новая армия и Бэйянская армия, которые были созданы в конце XIX века.
Основание
[править | править код]Прежде чем вернуть Аньцин в конце 1861 года, Цзэн Гофань приказал своему ученику Ли Хунчжану (1823—1901) вернуть часть Сянской армии обратно в Аньхой, на родину Ли, для военной службы и организовать независимые силы под командованием Ли Хунчжана. Их общая численность составляла 25 000 солдат, включая некоторых сдавшихся тайпинов в Аньцине. Ли Хунчжан объединил эти силы в одну армию, и после трёх месяцев обучения они дали своё первое сражение — битву при Шанхае (1861 г.).
Ли Хунчжан командовал Хуайской армией, которая была частью новой серии региональных армий, известных как Юн Ин, введённых в Китай после восстания няньцзюней. В отличие от Маньчжурской восьмизнамённой армии или армии зелёного знамени, офицеры в этих региональных армиях не менялись; они выбирали солдат под своё командование и устанавливали с ними патерналистские отношения. Эти армии были оснащены современным вооружением[1].
История
[править | править код]Офицеры Хуайской армии, такие как Ча Лянь-пяо (Чжа Ляньбяо), также изучали западные военные учения за границей, в Германии[2].
Генерал Чжоу Шэнчуань (? — 1884) был тун-лином/тонглином (командиром) одного из лучших подразделений армии Аньхой в провинции Чжили. Он призвал Ли Хунчжана закупить современное иностранное оружие[3]. Патернализм Хуайской армии и отношения между солдатами и офицерами высоко оценил генерал Чжоу, который также практиковал кумовство в своём подразделении[4].
Западные военные учения были проведены Чжоу, и офицерам было предложено принять в них участие. За хорошую и плохую стрельбу применялись награды и наказания соответственно с выдачей «знаков заслуг» и денег[5].
Чжоу чрезвычайно интересовался современными технологиями, такими как медицина, телеграф и железные дороги, критикуя британского советника Чарльза Гордона за то, что он не рассматривал возможность их широкого использования в войне. Немецкие офицеры-инструкторы Ли Хунчжана подверглись критике со стороны Чжоу за незнание стрельбы лёжа и боевых действий в ночное время. Жители Запада и японцы хвалили его войска, и их считали «первосортными». Чжоу сказал, что через два десятилетия в отряде воцарился «сумеречный воздух», и его эффективность снизилась[6].
Унтер-офицеры Хуайской армии прошли «специальную подготовку»[7].
Ли Хунчжан дал высокопоставленные офицерские звания в Армии Зелёного Стандарта в провинции Чжили офицерам Аньхойской армии[8].
Подразделения Хуайской армии служили против французов в Тонкине и Формозе во время китайско-французской войны. Хотя они иногда одерживали победу, они проиграли большую часть сражений, в которых участвовали[9].
Войска Хуайской армии были размещены правительством в различных провинциях по всему Китаю, таких как Чжили, Шаньси, Хубэй, Цзянсу и Шэньси, всего около 45 000 человек. Они также участвовали в Первой китайско-японской войне[10].
Руководство генералом Лю Минчуанем Хуайской армией позволило китайцам противостоять французским войскам в бою на Тайване[11].
Когда французы попытались захватить тайваньские форты Килунг и атаковать возле Тамсуи, они были отброшены солдатами Аньхэя под командованием генерала Лю[12].
Большинство офицеров Хуайской армии не имели официальных степеней и званий, поскольку после модернизации китайской армии на военную службу стали поступать больше простых людей, чем учёных[13].
Офицеры
[править | править код]Основные лидеры
[править | править код]- Ли Хунчжан (李鴻章; 1823—1901)
- Лю Бинчжан (刘秉璋; 1826—1905)
- Чэн Сюэчи (程學啟, 1829—1864)
- Лю Минчуань (劉銘傳; 1836—1896)
- Го Сунлинь (郭松林; 1833—1880)
Второстепенные лидеры
[править | править код]- Юань Шикай (袁世凯; 1859—1916)
- Чжан Шушэн (張樹聲; 1824—1884)
- Чжан Шушан (張樹珊; ? — 1867)
- Пан Динсинь (潘鼎新, 1828—1888)
Примечания
[править | править код]- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 202. — «By the end of the Nien War in 1868, a new kind of military force had emerged as the Ch'ing dynasty's chief bulwark of security. Often referred to by historians as regional armies, these forces were generally described at the time as yung-ying (lit. "brave battalions"). In the 1860s such forces throughout all the empire totaled more than 300,000 men, They included the remnants of the old Hunan Army (Hsiang-chün) founded by Tseng Kuo-fan, the resuscitated Hunan Army (usually called Ch'u-chün) under Tso Tsung-t'ang, and the Anhwei Army (Huai-chün) coordinated by Li Hung-chang. There were also smaller forces of a similar nature in Honan (Yü-chün), Shantung, (Tung-chün), Yunnan (Tien-chün) and Szechwan (Ch'uan-chün). These forces were distinguished generally by their greater use of Western weapons and they were more costly to maintain. More fundamentally they capitalized for military purposes on the particularistic loyalties of the traditional society. Both the strength and the weakness of the yung-ying were to be found in the close personal bonds that were formed between the higher and lower officers and between officers and men. In this respect they differed from the traditional Ch'ing imperial armies--both the banner forces and the Green Standard Army.». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 245. — «Ch'a Lien-piao, one of several Anhwei Army officers whom Li had sent to Germany for training during the 1870s, received Chou's special praise for expertise in Western drill.». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 244. — «Li seems to have left the training of the Anhwei Army troops to two or three high commanders (t'ung-ling) in Chihli, among whom Chou Sheng-ch'uan (1833-85) was the most energetic and conscientious. A veteran of the Taiping and Nien wars, Chou in the 1870s commanded the best-equipped detachment of the Anhwei Army, with usually more than 10,000 men under him. Like Li, Chou placed great emphasis on modern weapons. Quite knowledgeable about them, he repeatedly recommended that Li purchase Krupp cannon, Remington, Snyder and other modern rifles, Gatling guns and the like. His petitions to Li and instructions to his own troops indicate his awareness of the need not only to acquire and to keep in good condition new Western weapons, but also to provide systematic training in their use.». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 246. — «Chou lauded the paternalism and interpersonal rapport that characterized the Anhwei Army--in fact, he had staffed his detachment with many of his own relatives. Although he himself greatly admired the skill and knowledge of foreign-educated officers such as Ch'a Lien-piao, Chou seldom recommended them for the Green Standard titles and offices so coveted by the yung-ying officers.». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 245. — «Unlike some other yung-ying commanders, Chou was also convinced of the advantages of Western-style instruction and drill. He not only produced manuals, but often personally supervised the drill of his troops and continually exhorted his battalion and company officers to take part in it, too. Money rewards and 'badges of merit' (kung-p'ai) were recommended for superior marksmanship ; poor performance was punished.». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 245. — «Although Chou did not want to employ Western instructors for his force, he often solicited foreign advice. Yet he reacted defensively, at times defiantly, to foreign criticism. He was skeptical, for example, of much of Gordon's military advice when the Victorian hero returned to China during the Ili crisis of 1880, and he even took to task the German officers that Li employed in the 1880s for knowing too little of night fighting and the advantages of prone firing. At times Chou clearly misunderstood the point of foreign advice--for example, when he characterized Gordon's advocacy of mobile, guerrilla-like tactics as laughable. Yet his charge that Gordon underestimated the importance of sophisticated technology seems fair enough. Chou, like Li, had a sustained interest in applied sciences (especially medicine) and modern means of communication, including the telegraph and railway. At least by contemporary Chinese standards, the battalions under Chou's command constituted a first-rate force. Japanese, German, British and American accounts of his troops are basically favorable. Yet several times during the early 1880s Chou himself remarked that the force had declined, that after 20 years it had lost its sharpness and acquired a 'twilight air'. The problem lay not so much in equipment as in the yung-ying system for the selection and promotion of officers. The experienced officers, Chou complained, lacked vigour, while the new ones lacked knowledge. Although Chou repeatedly admonished his battalion and company officers to participate in drill as strenuously as their troops, the officers continued to resist such involvement. It was, they felt, degrading. Chou's own writings as well as independent foreign observations note this crucial». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 541. — «In 1853 Tseng Kuo-fan introduced special training for the non-commissioned officers of his new Hunan Army, emphasizing endurance and discipline. This was later imitated by the Anhwei Army. The technical training of the officer corps along western lines was begun in 1852 at Shanghai and Ningpo, where a few company commanders and their men were trained in the use of Western equipment and tactics by French and English military advisers.». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 244. — «Soon after arriving in Chihli in 1870, Li began to integrate Chihli's Western-trained military forces into his own military organization, hopeful of putting these local resources to more effective use. He began with the 6,000 or so Green Standard lien-chün troops of the province, attempting to provide them with the same kind of drill and instruction as were available to his own men. He also secured the appointment of Anhwei Army commanders as high officers of the province's Green Standard system, in each case with Peking's approval. Ch'ung-hou's foreign arms and cannon corps, which Li inherited, was given retraining. Li refortified Taku and built a strategic walled city fronting the river ten miles form the estuary. He also expanded the Tientsin Arsenal, having been allocated funds for the purpose from the Tientsin maritime customs.107». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 244. — «During the Sino-French War on 1884-1885, the Anhwei Army fought in both Tongking and Taiwan, and in the conflict with Japan in 1894-5, Li's troops saw action on every major front.». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 244. — «By 1871, the Anhwei Army numbered nearly 45,000 troops, of which 13,500 were stationed in Chihli. The rest were located, as directed by the throne, in Shansi (3,000), Hupei (3,500), Kiangsu (4,500) and Shensi (20,000). In subsequent years, Li's troops continued to serve as the major defence force not only in Chihli, but also in several other provinces, in each case under the control of the top official of the province. During the Sino-French War on 1884-5, the Anhwei Army fought in both Tongking and Taiwan, and in the conflict with Japan in 1894-5, Li's troops saw action on every major front.». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 252. — «Only on Taiwan were Chinese forces able to hold their own man-for-man against the French, thanks largely to the astute preparations by Liu Ming-ch'uan and the tactical ability of a few Anhwei Army officers.». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 251. — «In early August, forces directed by Liu Ming-ch'uan, the famous Anhwei Army commander, repulsed an assault by Admiral Lespès aimed at the Keelung forts on Taiwan, and in October the French suffered another serious setback near Tamsui.». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
- ↑ Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911 / John King Fairbank ; Kwang-Ching Liu ; Denis Crispin Twitchett. — illustrated. — Cambridge University Press, 1980. — Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series. — P. 540. — «the cases of Hunan particulartly illustrates this widespread militarization of the scholar class. . .Such was also the case of Liu Ming-ch'uan who rose form smuggling salt to leading an army in Anhwei, and finally to the governorship of the province of Taiwan (see chapter 4). . . Until 1856 most of the officers of the Hunan Army were scholars, The proportion dropped sharply for commissions given after this date. . . Holders of official titles and degrees accounted for only 12 per cent of the military command of the Huai Army, and at most a third of the core of the Huai clique, that is the top commanders of the eleven army corps.». — ISBN 0-521-22029-7.
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